经济宪政视域中的中央与地方关系--国家结构形式对经济权力配置的影响

Study of Relations Between the Central and Local Governments from the Angle of Economic Constitutionalism——Effect of State Structure on Allocation of Economic Powers

国家结构形式对中央与地方之间经济权力配置关系的深远影响,可通过经济宪政进行宪政统合与矛盾消解。由于市场经济发展的影响,西方发达国家中央与地方关系配置模式日显趋同,单一制与联邦制呈融合趋势。相较联邦制模式呈现宪治化优点,中国单一制模式凸显人治化特征,引致中央与地方博弈失序失范。未来中国中央与地方关系配置模式,可以单一分权制为基础顺势创新,交融联邦制的宪治模式,实行经济宪政。经济宪政规则可内化于具体制度架构,实现事权划分宪治化、财权划分法制化、权力运行民主化、监控体制制度化。

The profound impact of state structure on the allocation of economic powers between the central and local government can be resolved by the economic constitutionalism and their contradiction in interests. The allocation model between the central and local government in the western developed countries tends to be identical with the development of market economy. The sovereign country and federalism tend to fuse with each other. Comparing with the federalism which shows the advantage of constitutionalism, Chinese model of sovereign country has the feature of ruling by man, which leads to the lack of norms in the game between the central and local governments. The allocation model of Chinese central and local governments can combine the constitutional model of the federalism on the basis of the sovereignty, so as to carry out the economic constitutionalism. The rules of the economic constitutionalism can be put into the specific institutional arrangement so that the power of administering the routine is allocated by constitution, the power of finance is allocated by law, the exercise of powers should be democratic, the system of supervision is institutionalized.