王朝君臣博弈与张良自保智慧

Game Theory between the Emperor and the Officers in the Dynasties and the Self-protection Wisdom of the Advisor——Zhangliang

中国古代高度集权的专制政体,决定了君臣间的主奴关系和互相猜忌,以及君王以诈术和暴力治臣,臣子或以暴力篡弑,或以韬晦之计自保。在刘邦抑功臣的政治恐怖中,谋臣张良,凭借其自保智慧,终得全身留名,幸免于难。其中的惨痛教训,值得建设民主政治关注、反思。

The authoritarian monarchy in the ancient Chinese history determined that the relations between the emperor and the offices were of master - servant beth in suspicion, which ended up in killing the officers or the emperors in violence, or the officers trying to self- protect wisely. In the period of Han dynasty when Emperor Liu Bang was in throne, the politics was in great terror; however the advisor- - - Zhangliang succeeded in self- protection. The tragic history means to bring concerns and reconsiderations to the constructions of democratic politics.