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现金股利偏好的三种理论比较与启示 被引量:1

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摘要 股利代理理论、股利信号传递理论和股利消费心理理论都是解释现金股利偏好的理论,但三者在研究前提和角度、理论基础、研究内容和研究方法等方面呈现出不同的理论品质。比较三个理论得到的启示是:上市公司应充分考虑投资者偏好的收益形式,以更好地进行财务决策;政策制定者应从不同利益相关者角度看待现金股利问题;现金股利研究过程中,应多进行跨学科研究,多种研究方法应并重。
作者 苏月中
出处 《暨南学报(哲学社会科学版)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2008年第2期41-46,共6页 Jinan Journal(Philosophy and Social Sciences)
基金 暨南大学人文社会科学发展基金项目<股权分置改革对现金股利的影响研究>(批准号:51105641)
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参考文献18

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二级参考文献20

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