基于竞价上网的煤电纵向一体化及其效率

Integration of Coal Enterprise and Power Plant and Its Efficiency: Based on Bidding for Accessing to Networks

煤电矛盾的根源是价格双轨制和地区生产不对称性,纵向兼并能有效解决现阶段煤电矛盾,但一体化是否有反竞争效应却值得商榷。本文通过纵向兼并交易的博弈模型,研究电力竞价上网背景下,存在上下游纵向兼并的煤电交易行为均衡路径及其效率,认为煤电纵向兼并的竞争效应与反竞争效应并存,但如果煤炭可现货交易,竞争效应大于反竞争效应。文章最后提出了相应的政策建议。

The confrontation of coal and electric power industry results from vertical dual-price system and region asymmetry between coal and electric power production. Vertical integration can resolve update confliction of CI and EPI, but we have to consider if integration will lead to non-competitive effect in power-generating market. This article studies coal enterprises and power plants transaction path and its efficiency after vertical integration on the background of bidding for accessing to power networks, through a game model of coal enterprise and power plant integration and transaction. It concludes that coal enterprise and power plant integration has two effects-competitive effect and non-competitive effect, but the magnitudes of these two effects are up to whether if there is spot transaction in coal market. In the end, it puts forward to some policy suggestions.