中国问题与日本1941年的开战决策--以日方档案为依据的再确认

The China Problem and Japan's Decision to Start War in 1941:Re-affirmation according to Japanese Documents

本文以1941年日美政府级交涉为主要考察对象,根据日方的原始档案,验证中国问题和日本开战决策的内在联系。本文以日本决策者的各种自白揭示:中国的对日抗战既是对日本死守既有侵略果实之企图的重大障碍,又是对日本力图进一步实现北进、南进和所谓"大东亚共荣圈"等扩张野心的最大牵制,从而也是对美英等国的全球性利益的必不可少的保障。日本当年在中国问题上沉迷不醒,其症结就在这里;美国最终拒绝在中国问题上妥协,其关键亦在于此。运用日本决策者自己留下的证据来重观历史,有助于人们明辨问题的实质。

This article focuses on governmental level negotiations between Japan and the US in 1941, using Japanese documents to verify the inner link between the China Problem and Japan's decision to start war. Through various revelations from the Japanese decision makers themselves, the paper shows that China's resistance war against Japan not only was a great obstacle to Japan's desire to hold on to the fruits of its aggression, it was also the principle constraint against Japan's effort to expand its invasion north and south and realize the so-called 'Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.' Therefore, the resistance war was a necessary guarantee for the US and Britain's global interests. This is the key reason why Japan remained obsessed with the China Problem at the time. It is also the reason why the US finally refused to compromise on the China Problem. Using the evidence left by Japanese policy makers to review history helps us to clarify the substance of the problem.