摘要
结合制度环境深入考察了多个大股东的行为选择及其作为一种治理机制的有效性问题,我们发现,多个大股东的公司治理作用只有在特定的制度环境下才是有效的,而在制度环境很不完善的条件下,外部大股东的监督是不存在或者说多个大股东的公司治理作用是无效的。
By considering the institutional environment, this paper analyses behavior choices of big shareholders and the validity of this govern mechanism. We find that governance of many big shareholders is effective only when being really under specially institutional environment. Supervision from big outside shareholders is not existing, in other word this govern mechanism is ineffective when the environment is not perfect.
出处
《上海立信会计学院学报》
2008年第2期65-68,共4页
Journal of Shanghai Lixin University of Commerce
关键词
多个大股东
监督
合谋
many big shareholders
monitor
collusion