市政建设外包中委托代理关系的博弈分析

Game analysis on the relationship of agency-principal in municipal construction outsourcing

从委托代理关系的角度,对市政建设外包中代理风险的表现形式及其产生原因进行了剖析.在此基础上,建立了市政建设外包中委托人与代理人之间的博弈模型.通过模型的构建和分析,在激励相容条件的约束下,给出了该博弈的均衡解,揭示出最优激励合同要在激励与风险之间进行平衡,并针对我国的激励约束制度尚不健全的现状,提出了相应的管理对策.

From the perspective of agency-principal, this paper analyzes the forms and the causes of agency risk in municipal construction outsourcing. Based on this, the paper also builds the game model beween the agent-principal and find the the equilibrium solution may satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint（ICC）. Then some relative administrative countermeasures are proposed.