关系性契约及其治理机制述评

Relation contract and its governance mechanism comment

研究者们普遍认为,关系性治理是通过关系性契约安排实现的。但对于关系性治理的机制问题,研究者们基于不同的理论视角给出了不同的回答。基于重复博弈理论的解释认为,在具有高度专用性资产投资的长期重复交易中,退出成本的存在使得对机会主义行为的威胁策略能够保证关系性契约的"自我执行",从而保证了关系性治理的效率。而基于"嵌入性"理论的解释认为,在重复交易中形成的信任、规范等非经济性因素可以成为防止机会主义行为的保障措施,是关系性治理模式得以发挥作用的关键。

It is generally agreed by researchers that relational governance is achieved by relational contract, but on the governance mechanism researchers provided different answers from different aspects. Expianations based on repeat game theory suggest that exit cost play an important role in the long repeat transactions by the threaten strategy to guarantee the self- enforce and the efficiency of the governance. While explanations based on embedded iheory proposed noneconomic factors such as trust and norms formed during the repeat transactions can act as safeguards to prevent opportunism and considered as the key aspects in relational governance.