大股东控制下的盈余管理行为研究

Research on the Surplus Management Behavior Controlled by the Large Stockholders

为了将稀缺的资本配置到优秀上市公司中,避免恶意融资,中国证监会对上市公司的配股融资行为进行了限制并直接诱发了上市公司的盈余管理行为,因此上市公司普遍存在虚增报告盈余以达到"配股资格线"的可能性,这是上市公司盈余管理行为的政策诱因。我们应采取一系列措施抑制大股东的盈余管理行为,如完善对中小股东权益的法律保护,完善股权结构,加强审计力度和上市公司的信息披露程度等。

To distribute the scare resources to the excellent listed companies and aviod the spiteful financing, the CSRC limits the scrip issue and financing behaviors of listed companies, and then it induces directly the surplus management behaviors of listed companies. So the listed companies exist commonly the possibility of increasing the report surplus exaggeratively to get the scrip issue＇s qualification line, which is the policy cause of the surplus management behaviors. So we should adopt a series of measures to limit the surplus management behaviors, which including perfecting the law protection on the minority stockholder rights, improving the share structure, strengthening the audit strength and the information disclosure of listed companies.