流域水污染治理模式的进化博弈模型

Evolutionary game theory for water pollution control in river basins

运用进化博弈理论,分析了流域治理中管理者和排污企业基于利益因素的动态博弈特征,并以淮河流域的治理情况进行了实际论证分析。结果表明,只有考虑基层政府的利益机制、适当的配套投入以及纳入政绩考核体系才能有效推动流域水污染治理。

The characteristics of the dynamic game between administrators and pollution discharge companies, each side acting in its self-interest in watershed management, are analyzed using the evolutionary game theory. A case study on the Huaihe River Basin shows that a mechanism taking the benefits of the local governments into consideration, an appropriate public subsidy system for the treatment of wastewater and a policy using the ecologieal loss as an index of government＇ s achievement would help to improve water pollution control in river basins.