摘要
非物质文化遗产保护中,管理者与使用者之间的冲突成为其开发难点。运用进化博弈理论,假定非物质文化遗产的管理者与使用者均为有限理性,研究其在长期演化过程中,选择不同策略比例的稳定性趋势,最后从政府管理者层面提出了相应的对策建议。
In Intangible Cultural Heritage protection, the conflicts between the superintendent and user become its development difficulty. With evolution gambling theory, the paper supposes the superintendent and the user is the limited rationality, studies it in the long - term evolutionary process, and chooses different strategy proportion stable tendency. Finally, the paper puts forward the corresponding countermeasure and proposal from the supervisors' perspective.
出处
《重庆文理学院学报(社会科学版)》
2008年第3期20-22,共3页
Journal of Chongqing University of Arts and Sciences(Social Sciences Edition)
基金
莆田学院科研基金资助项目(2005060)
关键词
非物质文化遗产
进化博弈
复制动态模型
开发与保护
Intangible Cultural Heritage
evolution gambling
duplicate the dynamic model
development and protection