我国农民专业合作社的双重委托—代理关系——兼论存在的问题及改进思路

The Double Principal-agent Relationships of Farmer Specialized Cooperatives in China——Concurrent Analysis of the Problems and Their Improvements

我国以少数人控制为特征的农民专业合作社表现出双重委托—代理关系的特征,其中中小社员与核心社员之间的委托—代理关系成为矛盾的主要方面,在实践中表现出对中小社员利益的侵害与合作社整体价值的损失。笔者认为,问题的症结在于表面健全的治理结构实际上流于形式,并提出相应的改进意见和措施。

The characteristic of double Principal-agent relationships is the farmer specialized cooperatives controlled by minority show in China.The contravention between middle-small association members and core association members is the main aspects of their principal-agent relationships.In practice,it invades middle-small associators' profit and caused lost of whole cooperative's value.This article argues that the sticking point of the problem is the perfect governance structure seems to be just in form,and make some suggestions and measures accordingly.