商业银行管理层股票期权激励：特征及其影响因素--基于美国银行业的实证研究

Features and Determinants of Executives Stock Options in Commercial Banks: Evidences from U. S. Banking Industry

本文以1996～2005年间美国43家代表性商业银行和98家制造业企业为样本,实证分析了商业银行管理层股票期权补偿激励的特征和影响因素。结果表明:商业银行管理层股票期权补偿占总报酬补偿比例的变化呈现出先升后降的倒U型趋势,商业银行管理层股票期权补偿占总报酬补偿的比例显著地低于制造业的这一比例;管理层股票期权补偿与商业银行成长机会、外部董事比例存在着显著的正相关关系,而与杠杆比率呈显著负相关;资产规模、管理层股票补偿对股票期权补偿水平的影响为负,但不显著;行业管制与管理层股票期权补偿费用的会计处理方法对银行业股票期权补偿有显著的影响。

We examine the features and determinants of executives stock options as a compensation in U. S. commercial hanks during 1996-2005. We find that, the ratio of executives stock options to total compensations in banking industry showed a inverted U shaped trends; on average, bank executives receive a smaller percentage of their total compensation in stock options than do executives in manufacturing industry; a positive and significant relation between the ratio of executives stock options to total compensation and growth opportunity, independence of boards, and a negative and significant relation between the ratio of executives stock options to total compensation and leverages; linkages between the ratio of executives stock options to total compensation and asset size, executives stockholdings are negative, but insignificant; regulations and accounting rules on the cost of executives stock options have significant effects on executives stock options.