摘要
景区门票价格涉及两个主要的利益相关者:景区管理者和旅游者。文章通过构筑博弈模型,讨论双方由于信息不对称而导致相互间的逆向选择,并计算出该状态下景区产品的均衡价格和均衡质量,进而给出了这种逆向选择的经济分析,并在实践基础上提出改善这种逆向选择所导致的市场运行低效的策略。
The price of the entrance tickets involves two main relating subjects of benefit：superviser in scenic spots and tourist. This paper discusses the adverse selection caused by the asymmetric information by constructing game model, figures out the proportional price and quality of the products in scenic spots in this condition. This paper also makes an economy analysis, and puts forward tactics which can ameliorate the inefficiency of the market operation resulted from the adverse selection.
出处
《华中农业大学学报（社会科学版）》
2008年第2期73-77,共5页
Journal of Huazhong Agricultural University(Social Sciences Edition)
基金
安徽省哲学社会科学规划项目(AHSKF05-06D26)
省高校青年教师项目(2006JQW048)
关键词
逆向选择
信息不对称
景区
门票价格
adverse selection
asymmetric information
scenic spots
the price of the entrancetickets
