公共支出过程中的信息不对称

Asymmetric Information in the Process of Public Expenditure

公共支出过程中由于信息的不对称,存在着代理人机会主义。克服公共支出过程中代理人的机会主义,实现委托人的利益最大化,可以采用不同的四种方式,归纳起来无非就是激励和监督。由于公共支出过程的特殊性,笔者认为应该以约束监督为主。

Because of asymmetric information in the process of public expenditure, there exists an agent opportunism. We can conquer it by four ways. In summary they are incentive and supervision. Because of the particularity of public expenditure, we think that agency incentive is the best way.