财政集权过程中的转移支付和财政供养人口规模膨胀

Fiscal Transfers and Expansion of Fiscal Dependents in China's fiscal Recentralization

结合财政分权的理论文献,本文描述了中国最近10多年来政府间财政关系的演变,并分析了财政集权过程中转移支付增加对地方财政供养人口的影响。利用中国1994—2003年县级面板数据和工具变量方法,我们从实证角度确立了转移支付增加与财政供养人口规模膨胀的因果关系,并指出在我国目前的政府管理体制下,上级政府面临着无论增加哪种转移支付都可能带来问题的两难处境。要在控制政府冗员增长的同时促进公共服务的有效提供,中国需要建立一个财政上更加分权和行政管理上更有基层参与性的政府管理体制。

Based on the theoretical literature of fiscal decentralization, we discuss the evolution of inter-governmental fiscal arrangements and analyze the impacts of increasing central transfers on local growth of fiscal dependents in the past decade. Using a county-level panel data set from 1994-2003, we identify the causality from the growth fiscal transfers to the expansion of fiscal dependents empirically through an instrumental variable approach. It is argued that under China＇s current governance regime, provisioning of either general purpose transfer or earmarked transfer would lead to serious problems. The policy implication is that a governance system that grants local governments higher fiscal power while at the same time hold them more accountable to local constituency is necessary for China to control government expansion and provide effective public services.