基于共同代理机制的发电商激励契约设计

The optimal contracts design of power generation company using common agency

共同代理是市场中普遍存在的一种现象。在电力市场中,设计合理的共同代理机制可以为梯级水电进入市场等问题提供一种新的解决思路。将共同代理理论应用于电力市场中,提出了电力市场环境下多个发电商委托同一个代理人的内生型共同代理模型,在代理人具有私人信息情况下,推导了发电商具有二次成本函数时委托人最优激励契约应满足的条件。并通过算例分析,对比了考虑和不考虑代理人参与约束两种情况的均衡解,验证了该激励契约的有效性,获得了一些有意义的结论。

Common agency is a widespread market phenomenon. In electric power market, the common agent mechanism designed appropriately can resolve many problems effectively such as how do cascaded hydropower station enter the market .Using the common agency theory, an intrinsic common agency is proposed to research the design of principals＇ optimal contract. The necessary conditions which the optimal contract should meet with quadratic cost function of principals are deduced. The effectiveness of the optimal incentive contract is demonstrated by the example results. The equilibrium solutions whether involve IR are compared, and some meaningful conclusions are obtained.