摘要
通过检验我国新设立审计委员会上市公司的操控性应计年度增量,发现这些公司的盈余管理虽在设立当年未被抑制,但在设立次年被显著地抑制了。对设立次年抑制效用的进一步分析发现董事会其他专门委员会对审计委员会有不同影响。本文研究为审计委员会制度有效性以及公司治理国际趋同有效性提供经验证据支持。
Examining the yearly changes in the discretionary accruals of Chinese listed companies which newly set audit committee, the author finds that although there is no decrease in the setting year, there is significant decrease in the next of the setting year. In the further investigation of the reduction effect, it appears that the other sub-committees of the board of directors have different impacts on the audit committee. The result provides empirical evidence not only for the compulsory setting of audit committee, but also for the efficiency of convergence of corporate governance.
出处
《审计与经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第3期28-32,共5页
Journal of Audit & Economics
基金
江苏省普通高校研究生科研创新计划(CX07B-247r)
南京审计学院院级课题(NSK2007/B18)
关键词
审计委员会
盈余管理
操控性应计
audit committee
earnings management
discretionary accruals