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公私伙伴关系的理论分析——基于合作博弈与交易成本的视角 被引量:12

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摘要 公私伙伴关系在城市的市政公用设施市场化改革中得到了日益广泛的应用。在总结相关理论研究的基础上,本文整合合作博弈理论和交易成本理论,建立了分析公私伙伴关系的理论框架,为研究政府如何提高公私伙伴关系的绩效奠定了理论基础。
作者 张万宽
机构地区 清华大学
出处 《经济问题探索》 CSSCI 北大核心 2008年第5期125-130,共6页 Inquiry Into Economic Issues
基金 联合国资助项目(CREATING A NEW DYNAMIC FOR PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR PEACEFUL AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:Human security and Equitable Access to Resources in Countries at the Pre-PPP Stage)的前期工作成果
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参考文献18

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二级参考文献75

  • 1聂辉华.交易费用经济学:过去、现在和未来——兼评威廉姆森《资本主义经济制度》[J].管理世界,2004,20(12):146-153. 被引量:107
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