终极控制权与资本结构的选择——来自沪市的经验证据

Ultimate Control and the Choice of Capital Structure:Evidence from Shanghai Security Market

很多公司中存在着终极控制权现象,终极控制人通过金字塔式的股权结构控制公司并以此获取控制私利,资本结构作为公司的重要财务决策必然会受到影响。以资本结构为对象研究终极控制权对公司财务的影响,构建一个全新的现金流量权与控制权分离程度的替代变量,结果表明在中国终极控制权比控股股东更能反应控制的实质和掏空的本质,终极控制人控制上市公司进行债务融资是为了通过举债获得可控制的资源;相对于国有的终极控制人,民营的终极控制人的上述动机更加明显;尽管中国上市公司独立董事比例较低,但是独立董事的存在确实能抑制终极控制人的掏空行为。

Ultimate control exists in many companies. The ultimate controllers control the list companies by pyramid shareholdings to get the private control benefit, and it has a direct impact on the capital structure. This paper researches the relationship between ultimate control and the capital structure using a new proxy variable and gets the following conclusions： ultimate control is better than controlling shareholder in explaining control and tunneling; the ultimate controllers use debt to transfer resources to themselves; this motivation of the private ultimate controller is more obvious ; although the proportion of the independent director is low, it indeed restrains the tunneling behavior of the ultimate controller.