技术外溢对研发机构许可策略的影响研究

The Effect of Technology Spillover on Licensing Strategy of Research Unit

研发机构拟利用一级价格密封投标拍卖方式,将其拥有的非显著工艺创新许可给下游的同质Cournot寡占厂商,以追求收益最大化。结合有无技术外溢,在博弈论架构内研究了不同情形下研发机构的许可比例,利用逆向归纳法求取博弈最优解。结果表明,技术外溢情形下研发机构的最优拍卖许可比例的取值范围窄于无技术外溢情形下的。

The license proportion with and without technology spillover are analyzed with a game-theoretical approach when an upstream research unit licensed its non-drastic cost-reducing innovation to a homogeneous Cournot oligopolistic industry by means of a first price sealed bid auction so as to maximize its payoff. The optimal strategy is obtained through solving the game by backward induction. It is found that the range of optimal license proportion is shorter when there is spillover compared to the no spillover case.