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非公开发行、资产注入和股东利益均衡:理论与实证 被引量:34

Non-public Issuing,Asset Injection and Equiljbrium of Stockholder's Benefit
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摘要 研究表明:大股东注入资产的主要动因是谋求资产注入上市公司后的流动性提升及资产市值迅速增加,实践中大股东普遍从中获得高增值收益;仅当注入资产能够带来新创价值,真正的利益均衡才可能实现,但注入样本公司的资产是否为优质资产仍有待于长期角度的检验。发行价对各股东的利益均衡乃至长期利益分配格局具有关键性影响,不考虑新创价值时实现利益均衡的发行价应等于上市公司每股内在价值;样本公司的非公开发行和资产注入过程中,发行价普遍低于每股内在价值,大股东很可能侵占了小股东的利益。若投资者只关心短期投机收益,则股东间的利益不均衡必然存在。 The paper shows that the main motivation of majority stockholders' asset injection is to seek liquidity premium and to increase market value of asset. The majority stockholders generally acquire a large premium in practice. Further, only when asset injection produces new value can real interest equilibrium be realized. However, whether the injected asset is of high quality still needs to be tested in the long-run. Besides, the stock price of non-public issuing is critical to the equilibrium of stockholders' benefit and the distribution of benefit in the long-run among them, and the issuing price at equilibrium should equal the inherent value per share, when newly created value is not considered. The paper also finds that during the non-public issuing and asset injection, issuing price is generally lower than the inherent value per share, and there may exists tunneling of majority stockholders. If investors merely care about return by speculation, the inequilibrium between shareholders must exist.
出处 《证券市场导报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2008年第5期26-32,42,共8页 Securities Market Herald
基金 国家社科基金重点项目(06AJL002)
关键词 非公开发行 资产注入 股东利益 利益均衡 non-public issuing, assets injection, shareholder's bnenfit, equilibrium of benefit
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