摘要
本文旨在探讨非对称价格管制对于双寡头市场上企业R&D投入决策的影响。通过构造无管制基准,对不同管制环境下价格竞争的均衡解进行分析,结果发现,非对称价格管制会对企业的R&D投入产生影响,政府许可的价格下调幅度δ的大小决定了影响的方向:(1)当δ足够大时,在位企业和新企业都会增加R&D投入;(2)当δ较小时,在位企业会选择减少R&D投入,而新企业决策者仍会选择增大R&D投入力度。
This paper investigates the effect of asymmetric price regulation on R&D investment in a duopoly market. Setting a non - regulatory (or symmetric regulation) benchmark, I analyze the equilibrium and give a comparison between R&D investment level under different regulatory environments. The results show that, asymmetric regulation does affect R&D investment, and the direction is dependent of the approved discount rate of price (marked Delta) stipulated by the government. Firstly, when in the condition a higher enough Delta, both incumbent firm and new entrant will increase their R&D investment. Secondly, in the condition of a lower Delta, while incumbent firm decrease R&D investment, new entrants enhances his R&D investment as well.
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
2008年第2期80-84,共5页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金
国家自然基金项目资助(70473071)
西安交通大学"985工程"<人口与经济社会可持续发展的政策与管理创新研究基地>资助项目