基于公平偏好理论的激励机制研究

Research of Incentive Mechanism Based on Fairness Preference Theory

传统委托-代理模型都是建立在代理人纯粹自利假设基础上的,本文将公平偏好理论融入传统委托-代理模型进行研究,分析委托人雇佣公平偏好代理人情况下的最优激励机制。研究表明公平偏好因素改变了传统委托-代理模型的许多结论,传统委托-代理模型仅是本文所建立模型的一种特殊形式。

All traditional principal-agent models are ground on absolute selfish agent. In this paper, based on the fairness preference theory, the traditional principal-agent model is researched. The paper analyses the optimal incentive mechanism when principals employ the agents of fairness preference. The analysis shows that fairness preference changes a lot of conclusions of the traditional principal-agent model. The traditional principal-agent model is a special form of the model set up in the paper.