基于演化博弈的电力竞价市场均衡分析

Analysis of Market Equilibrium of Power Bidding Based on Evolutionary Game

基于非对称演化博弈原理,分别对MCP与PAB竞价机制下的电力竞价市场演化情况进行分析,在此基础上,从市场效率的角度对上述演化均衡进行政策分析,分析结果表明:在MCP机制下,选择适当的竞价上下限,可诱导电力竞价市场收敛于市场效率最高的竞价下限;但在PAB机制下,则不一定。最后,对由5个发电商组成的电力竞价市场进行了算例分析。

This paper analyzes the market evolution equilibrium of power bidding based on the asymmetric evolutionary game approach under MCP and PAB bidding mechanism respectively, then explores its policy significance from the view of market efficiency, and the conclusion is drawn that to adjust the upper limit and lower limit of bid range is effective in order to induce the market equilibrium convergence to lower limit of bid under MCP mechanism, but not always so under PAB mechanism. Finally, a power bidding market consisting of five power companies is pre^nted to illustrate the method.