现代市场经济中的公司股权结构与监督主体——兼议王宗军、黄兴年关于公司有效监督主体的争论

The Ownership Structures and Monitoring Patterns of Listed Companies in Modern China's Financial Market

现代资本市场的发展和延伸(深化),造成了生产资料所有制的复杂形式。在中国,未来由谁来监督上市公司,尤其是国有大中型企业,成了世人关注的中心。中国股票市场的发展可能更容易沿袭AS模式,即以机构投资者和散户为主的控股模式。政府实行主动式监督与政府目标多重化的性质不符。让机构投资者来担当企业监督的重担,是一种合理的设想和预见。在机构投资者大量持股的情况下,只要限制他们的被动式监督行为,实行主动式监督就是其唯一的理性选择。

The expansion and extension of modern capital market has created complex forms of production means ownership. In China, Who will monitor the listed companies, especially large SOEs, in the future？ It is also a problem focUsed by the world. The development of China＇s stock market is much more likely to follow the pattern in the Anglo-Saxon countries： the institutional investors and individual investors holding most of the stock right. To play active monitoring is inconsistent with the muhi-objective goals pursued by the government. So, it is a rational expectation and a reasonable foresight to make the institutional investors responsible for monitoring the SOEs. When institutional investors hold most of the shares, as long as their behaviors of passive （speculative） monitoring are restricted, bringing their active monitoring into full play is the only rational choice.