相关市场条件下国际寡头的策略行为及福利效应研究

On the Game Mechanism and Welfare Efficiency of the Strategic Behaviour of the International Oligo under Correlated Market

本文在古诺双头模型的框架内分析了市场风险和相关因素对国际寡头策略行为和福利水平的影响。与传统模型不同,本文假设各国市场具有潜在相关的随机需求,且出口企业具有风险规避的态度,并利用博弈模型研究了市场风险和相关因子对成本竞争力优势形成的产出效应及国际寡头间串谋行为的影响。本文的推论表明:风险相关市场上贸易竞争形成的国家福利低于需求确定条件下的水平,然而,较之无贸易的情况却会形成更高的消费者剩余和社会福利水平,而企业利润水平的相对高低则取决于企业的市场风险态度、市场相关性系数和风险系数的特定组合。

The paper analyzes the impacts of the market risk and correlated factors on the strategic behavior of international oligo, and the welfare level under the frame of Cournot-duopoly model. Unlike the traditional model, the paper presume there are potential correlated stochastic demands in bilateral markets and the firms have the risk-averse attitudes, thus apply the game model to study the influences of the risk and correlated factors on the the output efficiency which result from the advantage of the cost competence while also on the collusion behavior between the international oligos. The propositions show that the welfare of country under the correlated market formed by trade competition is less than that under the certain demand, but can earn more higher consumer suplurs and social welfare in comparsion with under the Aurtary eonditiion, but the relative higher or lower revenue of firm is determined by special portfolios of the risk attitude of the firms, the risk and correlated indexes in the market.