社区选举：在政治冷漠与高投票率之间

The Paradox of Urban Community Elections:between Political Apathy and High Turnout Rates

本文试图回答这样一个问题:为什么在选民普遍冷漠的情况下,居委会换届选举依然实现了非常高的投票率?通过对上海市2006年社区选举的考察,我们发现高投票率与一人多票是分不开的。一方面,家庭而非个人是最基本的投票单位,通常一个家庭只有一名成员亲自投票;另一方面,无限制的委托投票赋予了社区积极分子事实上的"复票权"。这种局面实际上是政府、党总支/居委会、积极分子和选民共谋的结果。与村民自治相比,城市社区选举之所以缺乏活力,关键在于村委会选举以分配性利益为基础,需要选出"当家人";而居委会选举以维持性利益为基础,只要选出"守夜人"。居民的政治冷漠实际上是由社区的利益结构所决定的,而社区选举的制度安排又进一步强化了人们的冷漠。

This paper attempts to answer this question: Why are the turnout rates in urban community (shequ) officer elections surprisingly high even when electorates are generally apathetic to elections? Our examination of the 2006 community elections in Shanghai discovered a relationship between high turnout rates and multiple votes by a single person. First, it is the household that is the voting unit, not the individual. Usually one household has only one member who actually does the voting. Second, unrestricted proxy voting allows the activists to possess many ballots, a situation that has resulted from the orchestrated game by the government, CPC General Branch, Residents’ Committees (RCs or jumin weiyuanhui), activists, and electorates. Compared with villagers’ self-administration, urban community elections lack vitality. The cause of this difference lies in the purpose of the election: A Villagers’ Committee Election is based on distributive interests and for the purpose of electing a manager; whereas a Residents’ Committee Election is based on maintenance interests and for the purpose of electing a gate-keeper. The residents’ political apathy is in fact determined by the community’s interest structure, and is further strengthened by the community election system.