摘要
国有公司的激励问题一直是我国国企改革的重点,但无论是历史的还是现实的激励模式,都游离了国家所有权公权的本质和私法行使的属性,因而不可能使激励机制发挥应有的作用。在剖析国家所有权属性的基础上,逻辑地推导出国有公司激励制度的价值取向——兼顾公平与效率,运用这一理论批判了现阶段国有公司主流的激励模式——年薪制和股票期权制,认为其不是解决国有公司激励问题的有效路径,进而提出"经济增加值(EVA)薪酬制"应成为我国国有公司激励的基本制度。
The stimulation of state owned corporations is a key point of reforming state owned enterprises. But the historical and realistic models of stimulation are all far away from the basic nature of state ownership. So the mechanism of stimulation can't play its role. Based on the analysis of the nature of state ownership, this article infers the theoretical foundation of the stimulation system of state owned corporations, that is, fair and efficiency should be balanced. This article criticizes the main stream of the models of stimulation of state owned corporations—— annual salary and the stock's sight-right which is not an effective route to solve the problem of stimulation of state-owned corporations. Furthermore, it is suggested that the EVA system is the best choice of the stimulation of state owned corporations.
出处
《财贸研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第3期110-115,共6页
Finance and Trade Research