中国经济发展中的中央与地方政府边界研究——基于不完全契约理论的视角

Research on the Central and Local Governments' Boundary in China's Economic Development——From the Perspective of Incomplete Contract Theory

本文从不完全契约理论的视角分析了中央政府和地方政府的关系,并且基于此从经济效率的角度分析了中央政府与地方政府的边界。我们的分析表明,集权会损害地方政府的积极性,分权会提高地方政府的积极性;中央政府究竟是采用集权还是采用分权,除了要考虑中央政府和地方政府相互之间的外部性外,还要考虑基准到底是中央政府的效用函数还是社会总效用函数。中央政府和地方政府的边界会随着经济的发展而不断变迁,这个变迁过程是一个效率改进的过程。

This paper analyzes the relationship between the central government and local governments from the perspective of incomplete contract theory, and resolves their boundary based on above analysis in terms of economic efficiency. Our analyses show that centralization will reduce the local governments＇ motivation to exert effort, and that decentralization will increase the local governments＇ initiative. When the central government decides whether to centralize or decentralize, we should consider both the externalities that the central government and local governments impose on each other and the utility function forms which are used as the benchmark. The process of demarcating the boundary is a process of institutional change accompanied by economic development, which improves the economic efficiency.