基于委托代理理论的末位淘汰制的定量研究

Quantitative Study of Lowliest Place Elimination Series Based on the Principal-Agent Theory

针对我国目前企事业单位在实施末位淘汰制过程中的一些非理性行为,利用委托代理理论,建立了末位淘汰制的数学模型。通过严格的数理推导,分别对实施末位淘汰制的前提、实施末位淘汰制过程中的公平公正性问题和实施末位淘汰制后的激励效果进行了分析;得出了4条具有指导性意义的结论;阐述了实施末位淘汰制应注意的问题。

At present, many enterprises and institutions of our country have some non-rational behavior in the process of implementing the lowliest place elimination series. In view of this problem, with the principal-agent theory, we establish the mathematical model of the lowliest place elimination series. Through the strict mathematical deduction, we separately analyze the precondition of implementing the lowliest place elimination series, the fairness question in the process of implementing the lowliest place elimination series and the incentive effects after implementing the lowliest place elimination series. We have also drawn four conclusions with guidance significance and explained that many questions in the process of implemen- ting the lowliest place elimination series should be paid attention to.