经理人过度投资行为的柔性决策被引量：3

Study on the Manager's Over-Investment Behavior with Flexible Decision

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摘要由于委托代理关系的存在,经理人往往存在过度投资行为,这种行为损害了股东利益。本文在经理人过度投资行为决策柔性和投资项目价值不确定的条件下研究经理人的过度投资行为。通过建立模型,分析发现基于投资决策柔性时,经理人更倾向于过度投资,且要求更大的分成比例,进一步分析发现完善的市场机制、适度的股权集中及人力资本产权化可有效约束经理人的过度投资行为。 Managers will over-investment because of principl-agency, which damages the benefit of shareholders. This paper discusses the manager＇s over-investment behavior with flexible decision under the ob ject＇s value is uncertainty. By developing model, we find that manager will be more inclined to over in vestment and demands more sharecropping rate when manager with flexible decision. Moreover, the perfeet market mechanism, the equity concentrate properly and the acknowledge of property of human being＇ s capital can restrain the manager＇s over-investment behavior efficiently.

作者张红波王国顺

机构地区中南大学商学院

出处《系统管理学报》北大核心 2008年第2期167-172,共6页 Journal of Systems & Management

基金国家社科基金资助项目(04BJL031)

关键词经理人柔性过度投资最优停止问题激励 manger flexibility over-investment optimal stopping problem incentive

分类号 F270 [经济管理—企业管理]

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参考文献17

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