摘要
证券承销商担负着"信息生产者"和"质量认证中介机构"的功能,然而也面临着"可信性"的问题。在与证券发行企业、投资者的重复博弈过程中,承销商通过建立自身的行为规范,达成与证券发行企业、投资者之间的合作均衡所形成的声誉能有效缓解承销商的道德风险,保证承销商信息生产的可信性。通过分析承销商声誉机制的相关理论模型、形成机理及机制缺失的原因,提出了充分发挥承销商声誉机制的政策建议。
In financial securities issue market, underwriters play important roles as "information producers" and "authenticity certification agency" to solve the information asymmetry problems. However, underwriters are facing creditability problems at the same time. Thereby, reputation is indispensable for underwriters in order to release moral hazard problems and to maintain creditability as an information producer. Through drawing into theoretical model of reputation, the paper emphasized the effect of underwriter reputation, and then analyzed the formation mechanism and the causes of reputation missing. Finally, some suggestions were provided.
出处
《财经理论与实践》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第3期71-75,共5页
The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics
基金
教育部人文社科规划项目(06JA790030)
关键词
信息不对称
IPO
承销商
声誉机制
作用机理
Information asymmetry
IPO
Underwriter
Reputation mechanism
Formation