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基于顾客满意的渠道合作机制研究 被引量:1

A Study On Coordination Mechanisms of Channel for Being Based On Customer Satisfaction
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摘要 将零售商的服务分为短期性服务和基于顾客满意的长期性服务,由于长期性服务对销售量的影响具有滞后性,因此本文建立了多时期渠道动态决策模型.在此基础上分析了三种情况:①制造商对零售商的长期性服务不激励、②制造商对零售商的长期性服务激励和③渠道整合结果表明:如果制造商不对零售商激励,零售商也有长期性服务偏好;如果对零售商激励,那么零售商付出的长期性服务更多,他们的努力程度由零售商利润的贴现系数决定.同时渠道整合时,渠道总利润要优于其余两种情况.制造商对零售商激励时双方的利润都要大于不激励时的利润,渠道整合时双方的利润与他们的分配比例有关. The retailer's service was composed of short-term service and long-term service for being based on customer satisfaction, so in the paper channel dynamic decision model was constituted because long-term service affect market with delay, on the base of it, three cases was analyzed: manufacturers didn't incentive retailer for long-term service, manufacturer motivated retailer for long-term service and channel integration. The results show the retailer favors long-term service if manufacturers didn't incentive retailer; the retailer pay more long- term service if manufacturers motivated retailer; Their effort was made by the retailer's a discounts factor to future profits, at same time, channel total profits is more than the two others in the channel integration, if manufacturers motivated retailer, manufacturer and retailer's profits is more than no incentive, in the channel integration, both profits is related with their assigning proportionment.
作者 丁川 王开弘
出处 《数学的实践与认识》 CSCD 北大核心 2008年第11期36-43,共8页 Mathematics in Practice and Theory
基金 西南财经大学科研基金资助(07QN09)
关键词 分销渠道 合作 顾客满意 激励 distribution channel coordination customer satisfaction incentive
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参考文献16

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同被引文献23

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