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论核心卡特尔参与者申请宽大的时间条件 被引量:14

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摘要 核心卡特尔是世界各国公认的最严重的竞争违法行为,打击核心卡特尔已经成为主要市场经济国家竞争机构的首要工作任务。由于核心卡特尔行为具有很强的隐蔽性,竞争机构传统上采用的调查和办案手段往往对其无法奏效。为了解决这一问题,各国纷纷制定了从内部瓦解卡特尔、鼓励卡特尔参与者自首的宽大方案。根据各国宽大方案,申请人必须满足一系列条件才能获得宽大,在这些条件中,申请时间是最为核心的因素之一。
作者 金美蓉
出处 《政法论坛》 CSSCI 北大核心 2008年第3期141-149,共9页 Tribune of Political Science and Law
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