隐性保险体制下城市商业银行的市场约束行为

Market Discipline Behavior of Urban Commercial Banks under the Institution of Implicit Insurance

文章分别从价格约束、数量约束、外部环境对市场约束的影响等角度,研究了基于隐性保险体制下的我国城市商业银行的市场约束行为。研究发现:(1)我国地方城市商业银行的储蓄市场不存在显著的价格约束效应,但没有证据表明一定不存在数量约束效应。(2)政府隐性保险对银行债权人的价格决策和数量决策均有显著影响,且价格决策比数量决策、短期储蓄比长期储蓄受到政府隐性保险更大的影响。(3)省会城市城商行的市场约束力度要弱于非省会城市的城商行。

The paper studies the market discipline behavior of urban commercial banks under the institution of implicit insurance from the three angles of price effect, quantity effect and external environment such as the degree of competition respectively. We find that （1）there isn＇t significant price discipline effect in the deposit market of urban commercial banks, but we don＇t find evidence to reject the existence of quantitative discipline effect; （2）governmental implicit insurance has more significant influence on the decision-making of transactional price than that of transactional quantity, more on the short-term deposit than long-term deposit as well; （3）market discipline of urban commercial banks in provincial capitals is weaker than that of the urban commercial banks in non-provincial capitals.