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业主方与承包商双赢的工程项目费用支付控制机制研究 被引量:2

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摘要 建立了业主方与承包商间就建设项目费用支付问题的完全信息动态博弈模型,以业主方与承包商的建设项目费用支付(或获得)现金流的净现值对最理想值的偏差最小为优化目标,讨论了纳什均衡解,并运用遗传算法求得了建设项目费用支付的均衡方案,从而使业主方建立起了与承包商共赢的项目费用支付的控制机制。
出处 《工业技术经济》 北大核心 2008年第2期119-122,共4页 Journal of Industrial Technological Economics
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参考文献7

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