摘要
研究二级供应链中具有多种可替代产品,而零售商成本为私有信息时的制造商最优合同定价问题.利用委托代理理论中的显示原理,建立了制造商定价的最优线性规划模型,并通过图解法求出了零售商为高、低成本时制造商的最优销售额。进而求出了制造商的最优价格合同.用计算机仿真进行了数值实例分析.
The paper studies manufacturer optimal contract price strategy for substitutable multi-products if retailer＇s cost is private information in two-stage supply chain. Using revelation principle from principal-agent theory, it builds linear programming model of manufacturer＇s optimal price strategy. The optimal sale when retailer＇s cost is high or low is got by graphic means. Then the optimal price contract can be determined. By computer simulation, it analyzes the numerical solution.
出处
《运筹学学报》
CSCD
北大核心
2008年第2期105-114,共10页
Operations Research Transactions
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(60474062)
关键词
运筹学
供应链
博弈论
合同定价
显示原理
可替代产品
Operations research, supply chain, game theory, contract price, revelation principle, substitutable products
