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风险投资中道德风险解决机制述评

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摘要 委托-代理的实质是委托人不得不对代理人的行为后果承担风险,而这又来自信息的不对称和契约的不完备性。信息不对称可能发生在交易之前,也可能发生在交易之后,事后信息不对称会造成"道德风险"。文章对道德风险解决机制进行了回顾,同时对解决机制的发展做出了评论。
作者 杨齐
出处 《产业与科技论坛》 2008年第4期152-154,共3页 Industrial & Science Tribune
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