期刊文献+

信息系统集成中防止原系统服务商退出机制研究

Analysis of the Mechanism of Preventing Vendor's Exiting from Information Systems Integration
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摘要 分析主体参与信息系统集成的经济因素与行为因素,加入心理友好函数扩展"鹰鸽博弈"模型,并建立基于"囚徒困境"模型的行为决策模型;通过模型演算提出防止原系统服务商退出系统集成的补偿机制,即在经济利益补偿的基础上向系统服务商传递友好心理策略以强化其行为动因,同时系统集成服务商应对原系统服务商进行知识补偿,并介绍了一个应用案例。 The economic and behavior factors of the main participation of the information systems integration were analyzed. The "hawk & peace - bird" model with psychology was expanded. The model based on behavior strategy between vendor and information systems integrator was built. The mechanism of how to prevent vendor' s exiting from knowledge diffusion duiing this process, i. e. , conveying friendly psychology strategy to venders based on the economic benefit compensation was obtained to consolidate the incentive. It is suggested that the information systems' integrators should offer some knowledge compensations to the former venders. The application cases were introduced.
作者 游静 刘伟
出处 《武汉理工大学学报(信息与管理工程版)》 CAS 2008年第3期437-440,448,共5页 Journal of Wuhan University of Technology:Information & Management Engineering
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70472016)
关键词 信息系统集成 心理博弈 知识补偿 防退出机制 information systems integration psychological game -theory knowledge compensation preventing exiting system
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参考文献13

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