国防采购中厂商R&D投资决策的动态均衡

Dynamic Equilibrium of Manufactures' R&D Decision-making in Defense Procurement

研究了国防采购中厂商对国防研究与发展(R&D)项目的投资行为,探讨了军方如何通过对国防R&D项目投资补偿比例的选择来调控厂商的投资决策。通过对厂商国防R&D项目投资决策行为的动态均衡分析,从理论上证明了在一定的国防R&D项目投资补偿比例下,当参与竞标的厂商数为2时,军方所希望的厂商对国防R&D项目的投资决策不仅为Nash均衡,而且还是子博弈精练Nash均衡,此时军方可以通过对国防R&D项目投资补偿比例的选择来调控厂商的投资决策;但当参与竞标的厂商数大于2时,军方所希望的厂商对国防R&D项目的投资决策仅为Nash均衡,而不是子博弈精练Nash均衡。因此,为了调控厂商的投资决策,军方不仅需要选择适当的国防R&D项目投资补偿比例,而且还必须对厂商的决策时序进行控制。

The manufactures＇ behaviors in research and development in defense procurement was studied. The problem on how the military induces the manufactures＇ behaviors by tuning its own compensation rate was probed. By analyzing the equilibrium of manufactures＇ R＆D decision - making in defense procurement, it can be proved theoretically that if there are only two manufactures who participate in R＆D in defense procurement, the manufactures＇ R＆D decision -making can not only be Nash equilibrium, but also subgame refined Nash equilibrium. It was proposed that the military could control the manufactures action by choosing the proper R＆D investment compensation rate. However, when there are more than two manufactures in defense procurement, the manufactures＇ R＆D decision - making could only be Nash equilibrium instead of sub - game refined Nash equilibrium. Therefore the military could not only tune the compensation rate, but also control the order of manufactures＇ choices in order to control the action of manufactures.