政府的多重利益驱动与银行的信贷行为

On the Bank's Lending Behavior and Government's Multiple Incentives

本文以我国转型经济下政府、国有银行和国有企业的紧密联系作为研究的背景,深入分析了政府多重利益驱动下的银行目标函数,并以会计稳健性标准作为衡量银行对债务人信贷要求的指标,实证检验了这一制度安排下的银行信贷行为。研究结果表明:总体而言,随着一系列商业化改革的完成,国有银行的经营理念正在向现代商业银行趋近,对于没有政府干预或干预较少的贷款,其信贷要求能够根据债务人的风险作出相应的调整。然而,仍然存在的"政治性"贷款又使其信贷行为出现了一定程度的"异化",即使得银行对债务人的贷款标准不能根据风险作出相应的调整,并且造成了其对国有企业和非国有企业信贷标准的差异。此外,来自政府提高资产质量的压力和向非国有企业发放信贷时潜在的政治成本迫使国有银行为了控制信贷风险对非国有企业要求过于严格的信贷标准。

This paper studies the bank＇s multiple objectives and their lending behavior in the transitional period of China. Using accounting conservatism to proxy for the bank＇s requirement toward borrowers＇ financial condition, the authors find that bank＇s lending behavior is more market-motivated after the reform. The bank will adjust their lending policies according to the borrower＇s financial risk when their lending behavior is not intervened by the government. However, if the government involved into bank＇s lending behavior, they probably couldn＇t make efficient lending decisions, which may partly explain why they discriminate against private firms. Furthermore, the paper concludes that the potential political cost of lending to the private company and the pressure from the government to improve the asset quality of the bank would make this discrimination even more severe.