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三种农户信贷技术的绩效比较研究 被引量:21

The Comparative Study of the Performance of Rural Credit Techniques
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摘要 农户信贷技术多种多样,适合不同的社会环境条件,具有不同的效率。哪种信贷技术适合中国农户的市场条件和基本经济特征?哪种信贷技术更符合激励相容的要求,更有利于提高信息利用效率,更能够提高全社会的福利呢?本文利用经济机制设计理论对传统的农贷技术、农地抵押技术和小额信贷技术进行了比较分析,主要结论是:(1)在激励相容问题上,小额信贷和农地抵押都是符合激励相容条件的。(2)在有效利用信息问题上,小额信贷技术的信息成本要高于农地抵押技术。小额信贷技术充分揭示信息需要更为复杂的合同,其隐私保障能力不足和信息空间维数过多等问题都使得小额信贷信息处理难度加大。(3)小额信贷技术是市场环境处于中等完善情况下的最优选择,而农地抵押是在市场环境比较完善情况下的最优选择。上述分析表明,选择适用的农户信贷技术并不是一件容易的事。在市场条件并不完善的情况下,即使是选择小额信贷技术,也要考虑其信息有效性问题。当然,最佳的选择是通过完善市场条件,使得农户可以通过抵押农地获得信贷资金。 The article compares traditional rural credit model, farming land mortgage technique and micro-credit techniques under the framework of economic mechanism devising approach. The conclusions are as follows: (1) both the micro-credit technique and farming land mortgage technique are in conforming to incentive compatibility condition. (2) The information usage cost of micro-credit technique is higher than that of farming land mortgage technique. (3) Different market circumstances result in different social welfare of various credit techniques. Micro-credit technique is the best choice in a moderating perfect market whereas farming land mortgage technique is the best choice in a relative perfect and complete market. All these analysis make it clear that it is a difficult job to select suitable rural credit technique. But the best way is to further improve market condition so as to apply farming land mortgage technique, which is better as to information using efficiency.
作者 陈建新
出处 《金融研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2008年第6期144-157,共14页 Journal of Financial Research
关键词 农户信贷技术 信息不对称 机制设计 rural credit technique, incentive compatibility, information usage, resources allocation
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参考文献9

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