投资基金信息适度披露制度的经济学分析

Economic analysis of investment fund information disclosure system

文章详细论述了基金信息适度披露制度的经济学原理,利用动力机制和契约供给作为基础工具,借助比较信息披露方面的私人边际成本和社会边际成本私人边际收益和社会边际收益的差异规律,分析了基金投资者和基金管理层在信息披露方面强制性和适度性的博弈行为。作者得出结论,只有同时坚持信息披露的强制性和适度性才是可行和现实的,管理层愿意披露的最优水平将永远小于社会最优的披露水平。

This paper reveals the economic principle of information revelation system in fund management.Adopting the motivation and contract mechanisms as the basic tools,it analyzes the game between the investors and fund managers on information revelation,by observing the differences between the private marginal cost/benefit and the social marginal cost/benefit.The paper reached a conclusion that the most practical and realistic way of dealing with information inconsistency is by both making information exposure compulsory and keeping limited information exposure.The amount of information the managers are willing to reveal will always be less than the social optimal amount.