对代建合同成本工期激励系数的研究

A study on the cost and time incentive coefficients in agent contracts

我国政府投资项目实施代建制后,政府委托人通过代建合同设计激励机制,促使代建人对项目进行有效管理。成本激励系数、工期激励系数成为代建合同的重要内容。研究围绕代建合同成本激励系数、工期激励系数的设计而展开,建立政府委托人、代建人、承包商的收益、支付函数,研究政府委托人和代建人的收益、支付与单一的成本激励系数的关系,探讨代建人的收益与项目工期的关系、工期激励系数与最优工期的关系,建立政府委托人和代建人的主从递阶决策模型,提出求解模型的方法。研究结果表明:在单一的成本激励机制下,成本激励系数的取值是不同的;成本激励系数、工期激励系数与最优工期是相关的;在设计成本激励系数、工期激励系数时,应使政府委托人和代建人双方的收益最大化;项目提前竣工的收入对成本激励系数、工期激励系数的取值有直接影响,提出了工期激励系数的计算模型。

After the implementation of the agent contract system, the government impels the agent to carry out the effective project management according to the design of the incentive system. The key lies in the design of the cost incentive coefficient and time incentive coefficient, which are main contents in the agent contract. The income functions and payoff functions of the government, the agent and the contractor are established, and the relationships between the income, the payoff and the cost incentive coefficient are studied. The relationship between benefit and project duration is discussed, as well as the relationship between optimal project duration and incentive coefficient. A Stacklberg decision model is formulated, and a solution method proposed. The study indicates that under single cost incentive system, the values of the cost incentive coefficient are variable, and the cost incentive coefficient, the time incentive coefficient and the optimal project duration are interrelated. The income of both the government and the agent should be maximized in the design of these coefficients. Finishing a project ahead of time directly influences the value of these coefficients. A model of time incentive coefficient is also presented.