基于有效工资理论的腐败行为特征分析

Corruptive character analysis based on efficiency wage

有效工资理论认为充分高的工资可以刺激工人努力工作,避免怠工.利用同样的思想,通过分析代理人的最优决策来考察腐败.利用最优决策机制,得到一个非贪污条件,这个条件类似有效工资理论中的非怠工条件.如果这个条件成立,则腐败动机消失,廉洁是最优选择.在保持非贪污条件成立的前提下,得到一个边界的腐败收入值,当腐败收入小于这个边界值时,随着腐败收入的提高,有效刑期惩罚可以降低,对这个与直观相反的结论,给出了一个合理的解释;当腐败收入大于这个边界值时,随着腐败收入的增加,有效刑期应延长.

According to the idea of efficiency wage, the sufficient high wage may simulate workers to hardly work and avoid shrink. By the same idea, the paper constructs a model and obtains an inequality called non-corrupt condition similar to no-shirking condition, which may judge efficiency of the social planner＇ s antieormption measures. When the measures of antieorruption satisfy the condition, corruption incentives will disappear, and the manager will choose not to corrupt, otherwise, because corruption cannot be rooted up even if we occasionally catch some corrupt managers, the successors will still choose corruption as their optimal decision. Under keeping the non-corrupt condition, there exists a boundary value. When the illegal incomes are less than the boundary value, the more illegal incomes mean the shorter term of imprisonment. The paper supplies a reasonable explanation for the phenomenon.