期刊文献+

基于委托代理模型的销售人员报酬激励机制分析 被引量:9

Analysis on Salesperson Incentive Compensation System based on Model of Entrust Agency
下载PDF
导出
摘要 以委托代理理论为基础,建立了销售人员激励的委托代理模型,通过推导,得出销售人员努力程度可以观测和不可观测下的最优激励合同,分析了销售人员激励程度的影响因素,具体探讨了企业外部环境不确定性、企业的销售管理水平和品牌影响力、销售人员的经验、能力和风险规避程度等因素对销售人员报酬激励机制设计的影响。 Based on entrust agency theory, the article develops an agency model of salesperson incentive, then we induce the best incentive contract when salesperson's efforts can and can't be observed, analyze the influence factors of the incentive degree, finally discuss how to design compensation system according to the characteristics of environment uncertain of enterprise, the sale mangement level, brand influence, experiences, ability and risk evasion degree of salesperson.
作者 吕涛
出处 《华东经济管理》 CSSCI 2008年第6期98-101,共4页 East China Economic Management
基金 2004年中国矿业大学科技基金资助项目(G200405)
关键词 委托代理 销售人员 报酬激励机制 entruse agency salesperson incentive compensation system
  • 相关文献

参考文献9

二级参考文献65

  • 1蒲勇健,杨秀苔.人力资本增长与新产品开发——一种修正的Romer内生经济增长模型[J].重庆大学学报(社会科学版),2000,6(2):48-52. 被引量:6
  • 2Kahneman,D.,& Tversky,A(1984.)Choices,values,and frames.American Psychologist,39,341-350.
  • 3亚瑟@W..小舍曼,乔治@W.勃兰德,斯科特@A..斯耐尔:《人力资源管理》,东北财经大学出版社,2001年3月
  • 4[1]Farley,John U. An Optimal Plan for Salesmen's Compensation [J].Journal of Marketing Research,1964.39~43.
  • 5[2]Basu,Amiya, Rajiv Lal,V.Srinivasan and Richard Staelin.Salesforce Com pensation Plans: An Agency Theoretical Perspective[J].Marketing Science 1985,4(4):267~291.
  • 6[3]Lal, Rajiv and V. Srinivasan. Compensation Plans for Single and Multi-Product Salesforces: An Application of the HolmstromMilgrom Model[J]. Management Science 1993,39(7):777~793.
  • 7[4]Shavel, S. Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal Agent Relationship[J]. Bell Journal of Economics 1979,10: 55~73.
  • 8[5]Dearden,James A. and Gary L. Lilien. On Optimal Salesforce Compensation in the Presence of Production Learning Effects [J].International Journal of Research in Marketing 1990, 7:179~188.
  • 9[6]Sridhar,N. Ramauwami, Srini Srinivasan and Stephen A. Gorton. Information Asymmetry between Salesperson and Supervisor:Postulates from Agency and Social Exchange Theories[J].The Journal of Personal Selling & Sales Management 1997, 17(3):29~50.
  • 10[7]Lal, Rajiv and Richard Staelin. Salesforce Compensation Plans in Environments With Asymmetry Information[J].Marketing Science 1986, 5(3):179~198.

共引文献89

同被引文献97

二级引证文献14

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部