摘要
本文研究了不同业绩水平下董事会领导结构与CEO更换之间的关系。研究发现,在业绩很好的公司中,CEO兼任董事长有利于避免不正常的CEO强制更换;在业绩一般的公司中,CEO兼任董事长则为业绩较低的CEO提供了保护;在经营亏损的公司中,这一保护不再发生作用。基于不同业绩水平下CEO更换的实质,本文认为,代理理论和现代管家理论在公司治理实践中是相容的,从而为研究两者的关系提供了一个新的框架。此外,本文的研究还为我国的公司治理改革提供了一些有意义的启示。
This study examines how board leadership structure affects CEO turnovers when firms are experiencing different financial performance. It is shown that： （1） CEO duality protects CEO from the abnormal forced turnover in out-performing fims; （2） among averageperforming firms, CEO duality entrenches CEOs from normal forced turnover; （3） there is no relationship between CEO duality and forced turnover in lose-making firms. Based on the different nature of CEO turnovers within different performance levels, this study provides a new framework which suggests that the agency theory and the stewardship theory of CEO duality are not mutually exclusive. We also try to give some suggestions on the ongoing corporate governance reform .
出处
《经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第12期10-16,共7页
Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )
