摘要
对于许多项目而言,投资商普遍拥有在利润流为负数时暂停生产、在利润流为正数时重启生产的"暂停期权"。文献[13]提出了拥有"暂停期权"的对称性双寡头投资博弈模型,本文针对文献[13]的博弈模型中两个投资项目是同质的这一不足,假定项目的投资成本及经营成本不对称,提出了更具现实意义的拥有"暂停期权"的不对称双寡头投资博弈模型,给出了不同情况下两投资商的投资均衡策略,并用案例对此做了进一步的诠释。
Investors have mothballing options that stop to produce temporally if profit less than zero and start to produce if profit more than zero. Paper [ 13 ] provided a symmetrical duopoly investment game model based on mothballing option, but its hypothesis has drawback that two projects are same. This paper supposes that investment cost and operation cost are asymmetrical and provides an asymmetrical duopoly investment game model based on mothballing option. We discuss both investors＇ investment strategies at different situations and explain them by a case.
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSCD
2008年第3期140-145,共6页
Operations Research and Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70473072、70773091)
关键词
管理科学
投资策略
期权博弈
暂停期权
management science
investment strategy
option game
mothballing option
