会计监管理论历史回顾及启示被引量：9

Apocalypse on the Historical Retrospection of Accounting Governance

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摘要本文回顾会计监管理论产生和发展的历程。有效市场假说否定了早期会计监管理论,市场失灵论也未能解释会计监管。基于产权理论和政治活动的经济理论的会计监管理论,把会计监管嵌入到企业契约关系和政府与企业的利益关系的框架之中,用契约成本解释监管对象的会计政策制定行为,用监管活动中的信息和契约成本解释监管主体的监管目的,为会计监管提供了新的理论依据,并为加强我国证券市场会计监管予以重要启示。 The paper retrospects the process of development of accounting governance theory. The efficient market hypothesis refuses the early accounting governance theory, and the market malfunction theory can＇t explain it. Economics theory and accounting governance theory based on the property theory and political activities embed the accounting governance the frame consisted of enterprise contracts and interest relationship between government and enterprises. Thus, accounting policies and governing purposes can be explained by information and contractual cost. This provides new theoretical support for accounting governance, and gives important apocalypse to the governance of our secttrity market.

作者刘冬荣邓永勤

机构地区中南大学商学院湖南大学会计学院

出处《财经论丛》 CSSCI 北大核心 2008年第4期77-82,共6页 Collected Essays on Finance and Economics

基金湖南社会科学基金项目(06YB07)

关键词会计监管理论回顾启示 accounting governance theroretical retrospection apocalypse

分类号 F832.35 [经济管理—金融学]

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